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Abstract
This article explores the metaphor of Science as provider of sharp images of our envi-
ronment, using the epistemological framework of Objective Cognitive Constructivism.
These sharp images are conveyed by precise scientific hypotheses that, in turn, are en-
coded by mathematical equations. Furthermore, this article describes how such knowl-
edge is produced by a cyclic and recursive development, perfection and reinforcement
process, leading to the emergence of eigen-solutions characterized by the four essential
properties of precision, stability, separability and composability. Finally, this article dis-
cusses the role played by ontology and metaphysics in the scientific production process,
and in which sense the resulting knowledge can be considered objective.
You can dance in a hurricane;
But only if you are standing in the eye.
The Eye (2015), by Brandi Carlile.
O diabo existe e na˜o existe? Dou o dito. Abrenu´ncio.
O senhor veˆ: existe cachoeira; e pois? Mas cachoeira e´ barranco de
cha˜o, e a´gua se caindo por ele, retombando; o senhor consome essa
a´gua, ou desfaz o barranco, sobra cachoeira alguma?
Solto por si, cidada˜o, e´ que na˜o tem diabo nenhum. Nenhum!
O diabo [existe] na rua, no meio do redemunho [redemoinho].
The devil exists and it doesn’t? That is the message; isn’t it?
You see: a waterfall exists, right? But a waterfall is a steep step on
the ground, and water falling through it; you either consume the
water or smooth the step, is there still a waterfall left?
Cut loose, just by itself, there is no such thing as a devil; none!
The devil [exists] on the road, at the middle of the whirlwind.
Grande Serta˜o Veredas (1956), by Joa˜o Guimara˜es Rosa.
∗IME-USP The Institute of Mathematics and Statistics of the University of Sa˜o Paulo. Rua do
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J.M. Stern A Sharper Image
Figure 1: (top) Blurry vs. Sharper (less aberration) images of star Melnick-34;
(bottom) Resolutions of 5, 10 & 25 pixels/line; Magnification factors of 1x & 2x.
1 The Sharper Image Metaphor
Telescopes work by producing images of distant objects at higher magnification and
better resolution than the observer’s naked eye is capable of. The magnification factor
(see Figure 1, bottom right) specifies how many times larger the observer sees an object,
while resolution (see Figure 1, bottom left) specifies the observer’s ability to distinguish
apart (resolve) two close objects, that is, resolution refers to the image’s sharpness or
amount of fine detail it makes available to the observer. Figure 1 (top) displays three
images of the same region of space, centered at Melnick-34 – a distant star in the Taran-
tula Nebula. These images were produced by: (a) The ground based telescope of the
European Southern Observatory; The Hubble’s wide field planetary camera, (b) before
and (c) after the space shuttle Endeavour 1993 mission to correct a spherical aberration
problem. While these images have the same magnification factor, their resolution range
from low(er) to high(er), from left to right, that is, images to the left are impaired by
stronger aberration or distortion effects that make them more confused, blurry or indis-
tinct, when compared to the sharper image to the right; Moreover the same images are
impaired by the occurrence of artifacts – spurious effects like pixelation, replications of
bright points by dimmer copies around it, or hallo-like effects around larger sources of
light.
This article explores the metaphor of Science as provider of “sharp images” of our
environment. As in the telescope example, the images we can possibly see obviously
depend on the instruments we have the ability to build and, perhaps less obviously,
also depend on the characteristics of our inborn (biological) sense of vision. Similarly,
we argue that our ability to interpret and recognize those images is constrained by our
cognitive capabilities, by our theoretical frameworks, etc. Accordingly, such intellectual
abilities are considered essential for our “mind’s eye” in producing and processing images
that usefully represent our environment. In this sense, the epistemological framework
developed in this article belongs to the philosophical tradition of cognitive construc-
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Figure 2: Galileo (1610, p.26-27) reported observation of Jupiter’s moon transit.
tivism, as developed by Maturana and Varela (1980), Foerster (2003), Foerster and
Segal (2001), Krohn and Ku¨ppers (1990), Zeleny (1980) and many others.
Nevertheless, the epistemological framework developed in this article has a distinctly
“objective” character that sets it apart from many alternatives in the constructivist tra-
dition. Using our optical analogy once more, the quality of the images provided by
a telescope can be characterized by tailor-made measures used to quantify magnifica-
tion, resolution, and specific aberration effects. Similarly, we claim that the quality of
scientific representations can be quantitatively accessed and correctly measured. Such
measures are the technical touch-stones needed to lay down the statistical, mathemat-
ical and logical foundations of the Objective Cognitive Constructivism epistemological
framework.
In previous works we define a statistical measure tailor-made for the aforementioned
purpose, namely, ev (H |X), the e-value, or epistemic value of hypothesis H given ob-
servational data X. The statistical, mathematical and logical properties of the e-value
are perfectly adapted to support and to work in tandem with the Objective Cognitive
Constructivism epistemological framework, as further discussed in Sections 4 and 7.
Nevertheless, this article does not focus on formal analyses of such mathematical con-
structs. Rather, its goal is to develop the optical metaphor introduced in this section
in order to explain, in an easy and intuitive way, some of the basic ideas and key in-
sights used in this framework. In accordance with this goal, epistemological arguments
are supported by figures illustrating analogies or providing visual context. In order to
better develop our arguments we use, as historical background, the science of optics as
seen trough the works of Giambattista della Porta (1535-1615), Galileo Galilei (1564-
1642), Johannes Kepler (1571-1630), Rene´ Descartes (1596-1650), and Pierre de Fermat
(1607-1665).
2 Galileo’s telescopes and astronomy, della Porta’s
natural magic, and Kepler’s optical theory
In 1610 Galileo Galilei reported the existence of four moons around planet Jupiter, a
surprising announcement since, at that time, standard astronomical knowledge assumed
that planets have no moons. Figure 2 depicts drawings by Galileo showing a fixed
star and the four moons he could observe swinging around Jupiter. On one hand, this
discovery should be welcome, for it could have very useful practical applications. For
example, moons’s transit times could be computed and tabulated, serving as the basis
for a clock available worldwide that, in turn, could serve as a much needed navigation
tool used for determining the longitude at a given location, see Aksnes (2010). On the
other hand, the addition of moons to the known planets was incompatible with the
Catholic official doctrine of the time. Hence, it is not surprising that Galileo’s discovery
became the topic of heated debates.
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Galileo made his observations using a telescope, a recent Dutch invention that Galileo
perfected and brought to Rome, and Jupiter’s moons could only be observed with the
aid of a such an instrument. Hence, a central topic of those debates: Should Jupier’s
moons, as seen through a telescope, be considered as “real” or legitimate objects, or
should they be dismissed as invalid artifacts or optical illusions?
In a letter written in the same year of 1610 to Johannes Kepler, Galileo bitterly
complains about his critics, as stated in the next quotation, see Santillana (1978, p.9).
My dear Kepler, what would you say of the learned here, who, replete with the
pertinacity of the asp, have steadfastly refused to cast a glance through the tele-
scope? What shall we make of this? Shall we laugh or shall we cry? Verily, just
as serpents close their ears, so do these men close their eyes to the light of truth.1
Galileo was prosecuted and judged by the Catholic inquisition, ending his days in
house arrest, see Finocchiaro (1989) for a detailed account. Over time, the “Galileo
affair” backfired badly for the church, making Galileo a martyr of scientific progress
in public opinion; see for example the play Life of Galileo by Bertolt Brecht (1955).
Hence, retrospectively, Galileo critics are frequently portrayed as obstinate fools that
deny obvious conclusions or even refuse to see what is clearly put in front of their
eyes, as Galileo complains in his letter to Kepler. Notwithstanding the scientific merits
of Galileo, for the purpose of this article, it is important to carefully examine some
arguments presented by his critics, as well as some counter-arguments presented by his
contemporary supporters; this is the main objective of this section.
Cesare Cremonini (1550-1631) was a professor of Aristotelian philosophy at the uni-
versity of Padua and a personal acquaintance of Galileo. Nevertheless, he vehemently
refused to acknowledge the objects Galileo insisted could be seen trough the telescope,
as attested in quotation in a letter written in 1611 by Paolo Gualdo (1553-1621) to
Galileo:
[Cremonini:] I do not wish to approve of claims about which I do not have any
knowledge, and about things which I have not seen; moreover, looking through those
glasses confuses my head. Enough! I do not want to hear anything more about this.
Galileo Opere vol.XI, no.564, p.165.2
Cremonini’s dizziness or mind confusion (m’imbalordiscon la testa) when looking
through Galileo’s telescope can be interpreted as a reference to the blurry images pro-
duced by those primitive telescopes. Following the analysis of Bernieri (2012), the
aberration effects in Galileo’s 1610 telescopes should impose a resolution limit of two
and a half Jupiter’s equatorial radii for resolving a moon from the planet’s edge. At
Figure 2, Galileo seems to report a situation beyond what he could directly observe.
1Volo, mi Keplere, ut rideamus insignem vulgi stultitiam. Quid dices de primariis huius Gimnasii
philosophis, qui, aspidis pertinacia repleti, nunquam, licet me ultro dedita opera millies offerente, nec
Planetas, nec [Lunam], nec perspicillium, videre voluerunt? Verum ut ille aures, sic isti oculos, contra
veritatis lucem obturarunt. Letter of 19/08/1610 from Galileo to Kepler (Opere, v.X, Letter 379,
p.421-423).
2 Questo e` quello, dico, c’ha dispiacciuto al S.r Galilei, ch’ella non habbia voluto vederle. Rispose:
Credo che altri che lui non l’habbia veduto; e poi quel mirare per quegli occhiali m’imbalordiscon la
testa: basta, non ne voglio saper altro. Letter of 29/07/1611 from P.Gualdo to Galileo; OG v.XI,
doc.564, p.139-140.
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Figure 3: Optics books by Fontana (1420) and Porta (1589, 1658 & 1610).
Our point is not to question Galileo’s drawings or data, but to highlight the importance
of taking into account the quality of Galileo’s instruments, measured by how sharp or
blurry were the images they could provide. After all, it is easy to understand how low
quality telescopes could undermine the credibility of Galileo’s observations – it would
be difficult for Galileo to convince someone by asking him or her to look at something
he or she could not directly and clearly see. Cremonini denial of the new “objects”
presented by Galileo’s telescope are further analyzed in Muir (2007), Boorstin (1983)
and Biagioli (1993, p.238). Fortunately, Galileo’s discoveries triggered a rapid devel-
opment of lens grinding techniques and telescope construction technology, improving
image magnification and resolution, and dissipating concerns in the line of those raised
by Cremonini.
Christopher Clavius (1538-1612), an influential Jesuit mathematician and astronomer,
rejected Galileo’s discoveries based on rather different concerns. He argued that tele-
scopes are instruments designed with the specific purpose of creating optical illusions.
Hence, any conclusions based on telescope observations should be, in principle, dismissed
as “fake news”.
Clavius said ...about the four stars [moons of Jupiter], that’s ridiculous, for one
needs to manufacture a spyglass that creates them for next display them, and that
Galileo can have his opinion and he shall have his own. Galileo Opere, vol.X,
p.442).3
At the time of Galileo’s discovery, most available books treating the area of optics,
like Fontana (1420) and Porta (1558), teached the art of Magia Naturalis, namely, how to
perform wonderful tricks and surprising experiments that could be produced by natural
means and used to entertain the public, including burning glasses, mirror chambers and
magic lanterns projecting illusions, see Figure 3 (left and center). Considered in the
context of this cultural background, Clavius’ objections do not seem unreasonable.
In May 1611, Luca Valerio (1553-1618), a Jesuit mathematician, formulated an epis-
temological counter-argument to the aforementioned objections, based on evidence pro-
vided by repeated and consecutive observations, see next quotation and also Biagioli
(2006, p.111) and Favaro (1983, v.I, p.573). On one hand, pragmatically, Valerio’s argu-
ment could justify the use of methods devised to filter out common artifacts from crude
3[Clavio] disse ...delle quattro stelle, che se ne rideva, et che bisogniera` fare uno ochiale che le faccia
e poi le mostri, et che il Galileo tengha la sua oppinione et che egli terra` la sua.
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observational data, correct regular distortions, or interpolate between observations, as
routinely done in modern astronomy. On the other hand, epistemologically, Valerio’s
argument provides some support for trusting a telescope, even lacking any explanation
of how and why such an instrument works.
It has never crossed my mind that the same glass [always] aimed in the same fashion
toward the same star [Jupiter] could make it appear in the same place, surrounded
by four stars that always accompany it ... in a fashion that one evening they might
appear, as I have seen them, three to the west and one to the east [of Jupiter],
and other times in very different positions, because the principles of logic do not
allow for a specific, finite cause [the telescope] to produce different effects when [the
cause] does not change but remains the same and maintains the same location and
orientation.
In his later works, della Porta (1610) tries to explain how optical instruments work.
Nevertheless, despite their diagrammatic or geometric appearance, these explanations
are mostly descriptive and qualitative in nature, see Figure 3 (right), Heeffer (2017) and
Borrelli (2017). Galileo himself offered no explanations on the inner workings of a tele-
scope; on the contrary, he protected the technology of telescope design and construction
as trade secrets, for selling telescopes, or giving them as gifts to influential people, which
was for him a source of income and prestige, see Biagioli (2006, p.127).
In the same year of 1610, Kepler answered Galileo’s letter, expressing a very differ-
ent attitude; for an inspiring short biography see Koestler (1960), for Kepler’s general
attitude concerning theoretical explanations see Holton (1988), Martens (2000) and
Stephenson (1987). For Kepler, providing a good optical theory and explaining the
bases of telescope technology was an important task to perform in gaining the public
trust, as stated in the next quotation.
In the Optical part of astronomy, I gave and explained a lucid geometrical demon-
stration of what happens in simple lenses. ...moreover, concerning the widely avail-
able circular tubes with two lenses, including the very instruments you, Galileo,
have used to pierce the heaven: I am trying to convince the incredulous to have faith
in your instruments. Kepler (1610, p.17-18), Dissertatio cum Nuncio Sidereo.4
Figure 4, from Kepler’s Astronomiae pars Optica, shows some diagrams (original and
modern versions) used by Kepler to explain his optical theory, see Kepler (1604; 1611;
2000, p.218), Heeffer (2017), Malet (2003) and Molesini (2011). Appendix A presents
this theory, known today as paraxial optics, in a very simple and compact form with the
use of the modern language of Linear Algebra.
Kepler’s theory follows a three-step program in the task of explaining how and why
a telescope works, steps that could be characterized as follows:
Scientific laws: Provide a sound theoretical framework based on laws formulated as
mathematical equations. In the case at hand, the pertinent scientific law relates
the incidence and refraction angles of a light ray crossing the boundary between
two propagation media, like from air to glass or vice-versa.
4 In astronomiae parte Optica ut quid in simplicibus perspicillis accideret luculenta demonstratione
geometrica redderem expeditum. ...adeoque & inter ipsos vulgo circulatos tubos bilentes, & inter tuam
Galilaee machinam, qua coelum ipsum terebrasti: sed nitor hic fidem incredulis facere instrumenti tui.
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Figure 4: Kepler diagrams explaining his refraction law (top left), simple optical
elements like lenses and mirrors (top right), and compound instruments (bottom).
Analysis: Identify key elemental parts of a system and provide a good understanding
of how and why such single or separate elements work. In the case of a refracting
telescope, the key optical elements are (thin, spherical, glass) lenses.
Synthesis: Provide compositionality rules, teaching how to put together several single
elements in order to construct a complex system. In the case of a refracting
telescope, this comprises means and methods for specifying distinct lenses and
their location in a tubular supporting structure in order to produce sharp images.
The next sections will examine and further explore Kepler’s three-step program.
Section 3 examines this program as a didactic approach to teaching science. Section 4
explores the epistemological consequences of this program and the fundamental role it
plays in the Objective Cognitive Constructivism epistemological framework.
3 Playing the Game of Science:
Objective Cognitive Constructivism
Os Cientistas (The Scientists) series was a joint project launched in 1972 by FUNBEC -
the Brazilian Foundation for Science Teaching, and Abril Cultural, a publisher special-
ized in magazines and inexpensive books, see Pereira (2005). The series had 50 issues in
total, sold every 2 weeks at news stands nation wide. Each issue contained: (a) A fascicle
with a richly illustrated and historically situated biography of an important scientist;
(b) An instruction manual for doing empirical experiments related to that scientist’s
7
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Figure 5: The Scientists - Descartes - kit of experiments.
Figure 6: Polyopticon - Optical components and construction kit
work; and (c) A small box containing necessary materials. The cost of each issue was
equivalent to only a couple of US Dollars, making it easily accessible and affordable
to teenagers interested in learning science in Brazil, at that time a fairly low-income
country, see Civita (1972) and Pereira (2005). A didactic and commercial success, the
series was re-edited a few times during the 70’s and 80’s, until it was discontinued due
to new safety standards in the toy industry.
Os Cientistas issue featuring Rene´ Descartes, suggests several experiments for un-
derstanding his refraction law. The provided materials include a battery lantern as light
source, slit-screens as simple collimators, printed scales used for angular measurements,
and a few small acrylic containers shaped as a half-cylinder, prisms, etc, see Figure 5.
These containers can be filled with liquids of different refractive indexes (approx.value),
like water (1.33), olive oil (1.45), monochlorobenzene (1.53), etc.
Polyopticon, manufactured by the Brazilian company D.F.Vasconcellos, was a “con-
struction kit” for optics, see Figure 6. It was sold at toy stores, remained in production
from around 1960 to 1980, and was also exported to the USA. The kit contains a variety
of simple optical elements, like a prism, mirrors, and lenses of several shapes. Each
lens is mounted on a supporting ring, and pieces of plastic tubing are used to connect
multiple elements. Supporting rings and tubes are all screw-threaded, allowing for easy
but stable and precise adjustment of distances between well-aligned optical elements.
The construction kit allows the assembly of a variety of microscopes, telescopes, and
other optical instruments.
The preceding examples are late descendants of earlier efforts on popular scientific
8
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Figure 7: Kosmos-Baukasten, Optik , 1923.
Figure 8: Hooke’s law, force measure, and (de)composition principles
education; among those, some of the best known and most influential are the celebrated
Kosmos Bauka¨sten, manufactured in Germany from around 1920 to the present day, see
Figure 7 and Fro¨hlich (1923). All the aforementioned didactic resources are concerned
with teaching of basic optics, and all of them seem to promote Kepler’s approach for
“guiding the perplexed” into a path of understanding. Specifically, they focus on one or
more of the following steps:
(a) Explain the precise and invariant laws that govern the trajectory of light rays when
reflected or refracted at smooth interfaces between distinct propagation media;
(b) Explain the behavior of simple optical elements, like mirrors, prisms or lenses;
(c) Explain how to compose or assemble complex systems putting together simple(r)
optical components.
This three-step approach is closely related to the cognitive constructivist fundamental
insight on the construction of objective realities, to be presented at the next sections.
In the next sections, we will continue to explore the metaphor of science as provider of
9
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sharper images of our world and, therefore, will continue to stress optical analogies. Nev-
ertheless, it should be clear that the epistemological framework of Objective Cognitive
Constructivism applies to any discipline of exact sciences and, with the necessary adap-
tations, also far beyond. Figure 8 (top) shows “Os Cientistas” issue featuring Robert
Hooke (1635-1703) and the accompanying experimental kit treating his deformation law,
how to test it, and how to use it to build dynamometers for measuring forces. Figure
8 (bottom) depicts spiral-coil dynamometers, and how to use them to demonstrate and
check the parallelogram law in the context of static force (de)composition; for a detailed
discussion of the Objective Cognitive Constructivism epistemological framework in this
application context, see Stern (2017a).
4 Recursive Production of Objective Realities:
Circularity and Emergence of Eigen-Solutions
Galileo’s telescopes did not appear out of nothing nor all at once. On the contrary,
they have evolved along a well documented historical process over a period of several
centuries. Ancient Greek and medieval Arab documents already describe the magnifying
effect of spherical and lens shaped glasses, some of this knowledge being lost or forgotten
during the European middle ages, see Bellosta (2002), Khan (2015), Mihas (2008) and
Rashed (1993). European paintings and documents from the end of the middle ages
attest the use of lens spectacles to remedy a variety of vision deficiencies, see Ilardi
(2007). Fracastoro (1538, p.18), as quoted in Helden (1977, p,28), makes reference to
double-lens spectacles used by visually impaired patients. Finally, in the turn of the
XVI to the XVII century, Dutch and Italian lens grinders learned how build a simple
telescope by installing two lenses into a tube, with either two convex lenses or one convex
and one concave lens, see Helden (1977, p.15, 35, 50), Ilardi (2007, p.209, 218), Porta
(1589, 1658, p.368) and Sirtori (1618).
From the Objective Cognitive Constructivism epistemological perspective, a lot can
be learned by analyzing this historical evolution process: On one hand, it is important
to realize that mankind did not have in advance a well determined road map to follow;
on the contrary, free trial and random experimentation had an important role to play
in this process. On the other hand, this process was not just driven by wild guessing
and sheer luck; on the contrary, this process had a convergent or self-organizing nature
that requires close attention. Figure 9 gives a diagrammatic representation of several
important aspects of this process and how they interact:
In the optical instrumentation production diagram, the right column represents tech-
nological know-how required to specify the components, like the shape of lenses and mir-
rors, and their correct assembly into an instrument, like a telescope. The bottom row of
the diagram represents operational know-how, like lens or mirror grinding techniques,
a business that requires specialized tools and materials. Moreover, an artisan manually
grinding a component will hardly get it perfect at the first try; on the contrary this is
a gradual process based on careful measurement of the component characteristics and
shape corrections, see Section 6 for further details. In the same way, the assembly of
a telescope requires gradual calibration of lens alignment and positioning in order to
obtain the clearest images. The production and development of optical instruments also
requires a circumstantial understanding of the aforementioned procedures, and such an
understanding is best provided in the context of an appropriate theoretical framework,
10
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Theoretical | Metaphysical | Technological
Mathematical ⇒ Causal ⇒ Instrument
formalization explanation specification
⇑ ⇓
Speculative Sharp∗ Project design
interpretation images & calculation
⇑ ⇓
Aberration Calibration/ Fabrication
analysis ⇐ observations ⇐ /assembly
optics | Operational | know-how
Figure 9: Optical instrumentation production diagram.
Theoretical | Metaphysical | Technological
Mathematical ⇒ Causal ⇒ Hypotheses
laws and models explanation formulation
⇑ ⇓
Speculative Sharp∗/ precise Empirical
interpretation laws and rules trial design
⇑ ⇓
Statistical Data Experiment
analysis ⇐ processing ⇐ execution
knowledge | Operational | know-how
Figure 10: Scientific production diagram.
as already analyzed in sections 2 and 3; this is represented at the left column of the
diagram. Understanding – why things are or behave and why they do – constitutes,
by definition, metaphysical or causal explanations, represented at the top row of the
diagram. Causal explanations are needed to make sense of what is routinely done and,
every once in a while, can also provide innovative intuitions.
Innovation can be beneficial all along the production cycle: New ideas can enhance
the design and specification of instruments and components, refine production means and
methods, or even improve the background theory itself. However, not every innovation
proposal is successful – in fact, only very few prevail. Therefore, it is important to have
good criteria to distinguish what works from what does not.
The precise formulation of good performance criteria can become quite sophisticated
and technical, see Section 6. Nevertheless, the essential motivation for such criteria is
easy to comprehend: Pragmatically, good optical instruments should present sharp(er)
images of our world. This pragmatic ideal is expressed in several versions of a well-
known pun:
• The proof of the pudding (or putting) is in the tasting (or testing);
• La pruova del testo e` la torta,
11
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– The test of the text (or baking pot) is the pie (or the twisted thing itself).
As clearly displayed in Figure 9, the optical instrumentation production diagram has
a cyclic configuration. All its components are circularly linked, and their development
imply cross-referent and recursive processes. Finally, sharp images obtained from good
optical instruments are represented as emerging entities at the center of the diagram.
This representation conveys the idea that such fine images are the result of an essentially
recursive development and perfecting process.
Figure 10 depicts the Scientific production diagram as a close analog to the previ-
ously presented optical instrumentation production diagram. Instead of sharp images,
precise scientific laws and exact compositional rules occupy the center of the diagram. In
mathematical statistics, precise laws are represented by sharp statistical hypotheses for-
mulated as mathematical equations, and these hypotheses can, in turn, be tested for their
precision and accuracy. Technical aspects of design of empirical trials or experiments,
data collecting and processing tools, and statistical analysis methods are represented
at the right column and bottom row of the diagram. The use of mathematical models
and development of scientific theories is represented at the left column of the diagram.
Finally, causal explanations are represented at the top row of the diagram. Causal ex-
planations are needed to make sense of routine scientific activities and, occasionally, can
also provide innovative intuitions leading to new scientific hypotheses. Finally, precise
scientific laws and exact (de)composition rules obtained from good scientific theories
are represented as emerging entities at the center of the diagram. This representation
conveys the idea that such fine scientific laws are the result of an essentially recursive
development and perfection process.
As it is typical of evolutionary processes, either in the case of optical instruments
or in the case of scientific disciplines, development and perfection histories can not be
characterized, in the long run, by homogeneous convergence, but rather by a mixture
of relatively smooth processes, like the fine-tuning of theory and experimental methods
within a given framework, in combination with more abrupt jump processes or sudden
transitions between distinct frameworks.
For example, in the XVII century, reflecting telescopes were introduced as a novel
technology offering significant advantages over refracting telescopes, see King (1955).
As a second example, Venables (2017) shows how Amateur Telescope Making was made
possible by two almost simultaneous breakthroughs by Le´on Foucault (1858, 1859):
First, the invention of a chemical process for silver coating glass; second, the invention
of a new simple and efficient procedure for testing and correcting the shape of a mirror
during the grinding process.
An example of discontinuous transition between theoretical frameworks is the re-
placement of Kepler’s by Descartes’ law of refraction, see Section 5 for further comments.
Kepler’s paraxial optics establishes a linear relation that can be stated (in modern nota-
tion, see Appendix A) as n1θ1 = n2θ2, where θ1 and θ2 are the incidence and refraction
angles of a light ray crossing the boundary between propagation media characterized by
refraction indices n1 and n2, receptively, see Figure 12 (right). In contrast, Descartes’
law of refraction states a non-linear relation between the aforementioned variables of
interest, namely, n1 sin θ1 = n2 sin θ2. Descartes’ law was a remarkable breakthrough,
even considering that, for small angles (as is often the case for thin lenses used in-
side a telescope), Kepler’s paraxial law provides a good approximation, θ << 1 ⇒
sin θ ≈ tan θ ≈ θ. For further comments on evolution of scientific disciplines from the
perspective of Objective Cognitive Constructivism, see Esteves et al. (2019) and Stern
12
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Figure 11: Fixed-point method converging to x = cos(x) = 0.739085 . . .
(2014, 2017b).
Notwithstanding the complex nature of the historical development of either technolo-
gies or scientific theories, we argue that an important conclusion holds: their evolution
can be characterized as an essentially recursive development process converging, at least
locally, to progressively perfected (eigen-) solutions.
Objects are Tokens for Eigen-Solutions:
Precision, Stability, Separability and Composablility
This subsection examines the nature and representation of recursive processes, the con-
cept of eigen-solution an its essential properties, and their importance for the justification
of qualified forms of circular argumentation.
Recursive computational methods are routinely used in applied mathematics. Fig-
ure 11 illustrates the Fixed Point iteration method, based on the repeated iteration
xn+1 = f(xn), being used to compute f(x) = cos(x), starting at x0 = −1. Convergence
to an invariant point, x = f(x), is not guaranteed, only occurring under certain regu-
larity conditions, see Garcia et al. (2003), Kelley (1987a,b) and Wimp (1984). In one
dimension, such an invariant point can also be called an eigen-value, and this concept
can be generalized to multi-dimensional spaces, for example: An eigen-vector, x, of a
vector space operator A (a matrix operator in ordinary linear algebra) is defined by the
recursive relation x = (1/α)Ax. Under appropriate regularity conditions, the set of such
eigen-vectors constitutes a basis, that is, any vector in the space can be decomposed into
or recomposed from these basic eigen-vectors, see Sadun (2007). Well behaved invariants
in functional spaces are called eigen-functions and, in general settings, such entities are
called eigen-solutions. This is the departing point for Heinz von Foerster (1911-2002)
celebrated aphorisms:
• Objects are tokens for eigen-behaviors ; and
• Eigen-solutions are precise (sharp), stable, separable and composable.
von Foerter used variant forms of this celebrated aphorism, see Foerster and Segal
(2001) and Foerster (2003), to convey the following ideas:
• The “objects” we perceive in our environment stand for invariant forms or fixed-points
of our behaviors or ways of interaction with the same environment;
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•Well-behaved (or objective) invariants are characterized by the four essential properties
stated above, a topic to be further developed in Section 6.
Circular argumentation is often identified as an indicator of fallacies, for it can be
used to support all sorts of bogus statements. For example, a lier and his accomplice can
argue: “I never lie, as my friend can attest; and my friend opinion is reliable, for I vouch
for him.” Under this circumstances, being aware of its intrinsically circular and recur-
sive nature, what is the justification for using the Objective Cognitive Constructivism
epistemological framework in the context of science?
We claim that such a justification can be found in the four essential properties of
eigen-solutions, namely: Precision (or sharpness), stability, separation and composi-
tion. Precision (or sharpness) is the hallmark of exact sciences, in fact, this is why
they are called “exact”. The great heroes of a scientific discipline can be easily found
in a textbook’s subject index: Their names are associated to the discipline’s precise
laws or equations (like Kepler’s laws in astronomy, Newton’s law in classical mechanics,
Maxwell’s law in electro-magnetism, Einstein’s equations in special or general relativity,
etc.). There is good reason for the status of these heroes and, more importantly, the high
status of the corresponding eponymic laws or equations. More refined explanations con-
cerning the four essential properties of eigen-solutions are given in the following sections.
For now, it suffices to acknowledge that the precision of the aforementioned equations,
together with their compositionality properties (that is, their analytic and synthetic
power) are ultimately responsible for the success of exact sciences that, in turn, consti-
tute the foundation of all subsequent technological applications that, in turn, allow the
production of so many gadgets and wonders we enjoy in the modern world.
This conjunction of, on one hand, the very high standards for the testing and valida-
tion of scientific laws imposed the four essential properties of eigen-solutions (precision,
stability, separability and compositionality) and, on the other hand, the extraordinary
power of scientific laws is, we claim, the primary source of justification for accepting
the circular characteristics of the Objective Cognitive Constructivism epistemological
framework. In a nutshell, we argue that this combination of pragmatic power and high
standard of validation provides a firm grip on reality, supplying reliable anchors for a
scientific discipline; in this specific sense, the same scientific discipline can be considered
objective. In the context of mathematical statistics, the degree of precision and accuracy
of a statistical hypothesis, together with the exactness and analytic/ synthetic power
of (de)composition rules associated to the corresponding eigen-solutions, are the key to
define quantitative measures of objectivity, as further discussed in Section 7.
Formally, a set of circular (coss-referent and recursive) definitions can be handled rig-
orously using non-well-founded set theories, see Aczel (1988), Barwise and Etchemendy
(1987), and Barwise and Moss (1996). Computationally, circularly defined data sets can
be represented, stored and manipulated using appropriate data structures, see Akman
and Pakkan (1996), Iordanov (2010), and Pakkan and Akman (1995).
Sections 6, 7 and 8 examine in further detail the role and characterization of eigen-
solutions in the Objective Cognitive Constructivism epistemological framework. Mean-
while, Section 5 examines in further detail the role of causal explanations in the practice
of science, with particular attention to some aspects of circular forms of argumentation
that complement the discussion of this section.
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Figure 12: Tennis ball analogy for Descartes (1637) law
5 Know-Why and Effective Metaphysics
In 1637 Descartes explained his refraction law, sin θ1/ sin θ2 = n2/n1, using an analogy
based on the trajectory of bouncing tennis balls, see Figure 12 (left and center). In
the case of reflexion, the horizontal (or tangential to the media’s boundary interface)
component of the ball’s velocity remains unchanged, while its vertical (or normal to the
interface) component is inverted. By analogy, in the case of (light’s) refraction, Descartes
assumed the tangential velocity to remain unchanged, while he assumed the total velocity
to be a characteristic of the medium. Moreover, Descartes assumed the (total) velocity
of light to be proportional to the medium’s refraction index, see McDonough (2015,
p.552) and Mihas (2008). Hence, in Descartes’ interpretation, n2/n1 = v2/v1, implying
that light travels faster in more refractive media.
In 1662 Pierre de Fermat derived the same refraction law from the least time prin-
ciple, stating that a light ray traveling from point P to point Q takes the path that
minimizes its travel time, see Figure 12 (right). Unlike Descartes, Fermat assumed that
the speed of light is inversely proportional to the medium’s refraction index. Hence, in
Fermat’s interpretation, n2/n1 = v1/v2, implying that light travels slower in more re-
fractive media. Appendix B gives a simple derivation of Descartes’ refraction law from
Fermat least time principle using the language of modern calculus.
Notice that both Descartes and Fermat worked long before any measure of the speed
of light was available. The first quantitative estimate of the speed of light, in sidereal
space, was obtained in 1976 by Ole Roemer (1644-1710), making use of what we would
today call a “Doppler effect” on the apparent period of Io (a satellite of Jupiter discovered
by Galileo in 1610), see Shea (1998) for further details and a historical contextualization
of Roemer’s work. Almost two centuries latter, in 1850, the first direct measurements
of the comparative speed of light in distinct material media (like air and water) were
obtained by Le´on Foucault (1819-1868) using a rotating mirror device, see Tobin (1993)
and Jaffe (1960) for further details. Only these latter measurements could finally settle
the old controversy concerning the faster or slower speed of light in more refractive
media, favoring Fermat over Descartes.
The aforementioned examples by Descartes and Fermat are fine examples of meta-
physical models, where the adjective metaphysical is used in two distinct but com-
plementary senses: First, in the literal sense, a meta-(beyond)-physical model makes
reference to non-observable entities or non-observed quantities like, in the case at hand,
the speed of light. Second, in the gnoseological or Aristotelian sense, a metaphysical
model provides answers for why questions, that is, it provides explanations for why
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things are or behave the way they do.
Notwithstanding the practical impossibility of observing the speed of light at the
time of Fermat and Descartes, their models offered contradictory predictions concerning
the proportionality or inverse proportionality relation between the speed of light and
the propagation medium’s refraction index. Moreover, these contradicting predictions
awoke the curiosity of scientists, sparkled the imagination of philosophers and drove cen-
turies of research in the field of optics, including the development of technological means
and methods for measuring the speed of light, as well as the development of alternative
models and theories concerning the nature and properties of light. For historical per-
spectives of several competing theories of light we refer to Ronchi (1970), Sabra (1981)
and Zemple´n (2005).
Descartes’ model focus on efficient or moving (κινoυν) causes, that is, it focus on
the agents that interact in a process to make something behave the way it does. In
the model at hand, distinct propagation media interact with tennis balls or light rays
so that they are forced to change their velocity in a certain way (given specific initial
conditions). In contrast, Fermat’s principle offers a teleological or final cause, that is,
it explains a process by the goal or end (τλoς) at which the process is directed. In the
model at hand, the goal is to minimize the travel time of the light ray (given specific
boundary conditions). These causes or explanations (αιτια) are very different in nature,
for example: Efficient causes refer to events occurring before what is being explained,
that is, they are based on prior conditions to the explanandum. In constrast, teleological
explanations refer to events occurring after what is being explained, that is, they are
based on posterior conditions to the explanandum.
Fermat’s principle is expressed minimizing total travel time; mathematically, this
principle can be formulated by minimizing an integral of the (differential) quantity
ds = 1 dt. In a similar way, Leibniz, Euler, Mauperius, Lagrange, Jacobi, Hamilton,
and many others were able to reformulate Newtonian mechanics, minimizing the integral
of (differential) action, ds = L(t) dt, where the Lagrangian, L(t), is the difference
between the kinetic energy (Leibniz’ vis viva), (1/2)mv2, and the potential energy of the
system (Leibniz’ vis morta). Hence, these formulations are called in physics principles of
minimum action or principles of least action; for an elementary text see Lemons (1997),
for standard introductions see Goldstein (1980), Krasnov et al. (1973) and Marion
(1970), for historical accounts see Dugas (1988) and Goldstine (1980), for philosophical
discussions see Nagel (1979), Tomasello (2005), Yourgrau and Mandelstam (1960) and
Woodfeld(1976).
At the end of the XIX century, least action and closely related teleological principles
became the grand unifying theme for theoretical physics – in the words of Helmholtz
(1887), a leitmotif dominating the whole of physics – and the accompanying methods of
variational calculus became one of the most powerful tools of mathematical physics and
other natural sciences, see Yourgrau and Mandelstam (1960, ch.14). Notwithstanding
the enormous importance of least action principles in modern science, there are persis-
tent philosophical suspicions or even outright distrust concerning the use of teleological
principles. The reason for these suspicions are related to the possibility of assuming
causal influences traveling backwards in time, leading to fallacies closely related to the
vicious forms of circular argumentation discussed in the previous section, see Nagel
(1979), Terekhovich (2012) and Woodfleld (1976).
One way out of the possible circularity implied by teleological principles is to invoke
a prior existing mind, consciousness, controller or similar entity that is able to foresee or
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take into consideration (either perfectly or with some uncertainty) all possible evolution
paths that could be taken by the system, and then choose (by setting appropriate
decision variables) the path that will best attain or come closer to the stipulated goal.
However, in many applications, like the laws of physics, such an assumption may seem
strange or spurious, see Helrich (2007). Even in the case of a biological organisms,
where such assumptions may be natural, we may not know in sufficient detail the inner
workings of the postulated controllers, making them weak providers of efficient causes.
The literature of Cybernetics and System’s Theory offers some epistemological set-
tings conceived to overcome the aforementioned difficulties related to the use of teleo-
logical principles, some of which could be seen as precursors to ideas discussed in the
previous section. We proceed with a brief exposition and comparative analysis of a
specific example, in hope of further clarifying the perspective offered by the Objective
Cognitive Constructivism epistemological framework.
Gerd Sommerhoff (1915-2002) proposes the notion of teleology as an abstract but
objective systemic property that can be discovered and attested by observing the behav-
ior of a system (over time), without postulating any conscious purposiveness or hidden
mental states. Sommerhoff is primarily interested in living organisms and cybernetic
systems, but his concepts can easily be adapted to physical systems; in this case, his
terminology of variables in the system’s environment and action spaces could be re-
placed by even more neutral terms like input and output (or answer) variables. In
a nutshell, Sommerhoff (1969; 1990, ch.3) notion of goal-directedness as an objective
system-property can be summarized as follows:
(1) If an action is directed towards a goal G, then [...] there exist at at least one
point in time tk during the action, two variables e and a defined on the environment and
the action [space] respectively, and a function f such that f(ak, ek) = 0 is a necessary
condition for the subsequent occurrence of G. Sommerhoff (1969, p.167).
(2) The variables a and e in the funcion f introduced above are mutually orthogonal
[...that is...] f(ak, ek) = 0 is a condition that must be brought about by the mechanism
involved. It is not implied by the axioms of the system. Indeed, random combinations of
a and e are conceivable initial states of the system. Sommerhoff (1969, p.165).
(3) The results produced by these directive processes have a high degree of a priori
improbability. Indeed, it can be said that the sense of wonder we feel ... is essentially a
surprise reaction evoked by the seeming improbability, and hence unexpectedness, of the
phenomena we witness. And in each case these phenomena have come about, despite
their inherent improbability because they have been the end-product of a directive activity
of one kind or another... Sommerhoff (1990, p.50).
Let us consider the three conditions above stated by Sommerhoff. If a and e are
variables in a continuous space (like real numbers or vectors), the equation f(a, e) = 0
defines a precise subset of the same space (technically, a lower-dimensional algebraic
sub-manifold). Such a subset is sharp, in the sense that it is very hard to be reached
by pure chance (technically, it is a subset of zero Lebesgue or natural probability mea-
sure). Nevertheless, the laws of physics (like the refraction law) are stated in this exact
manner. Furthermore, we can attest how the phenomena described by these laws “come
about despite their inherent improbability”. In the Objective Cognitive Constructivism
epistemological framework this situation is known as the Zero Probability Paradox – re-
garding the possibility of attesting strong statistical support for a statement describing
an extremely improbable (zero measure) event. For an extended discussion of the Zero
Probability Paradox and its epistemological consequences, see Stern (2011b); for the
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technical difficulties it poses to traditional methods for test of hypotheses in statistical
science and how these difficulties are overcome by the e-value significance measure, see
Stern and Pereira (2014) and Esteves et al. (2019).
Before ending this section, let us make a few comments on the importance of meta-
physical models, focusing on the use of alternative models even when they do not directly
imply discrepant empirical consequences. Richard Feynman (1964, ch.19) analyses three
different but mathematically (almost) equivalent ways of formulating the classic law of
gravitation, namely, using Newton’s attraction forces, the local field method, and the
principle of least action. Feynman (1985, pp. 50-53) says:
Mathematically each of the different formulations [...] gives exactly the same con-
sequences. That is true. They are equivalent scientifically [...] there is no experimental
way to distinguish between them if all the consequences are the same. But psychologi-
cally they are very different in two ways. First, philosophically you like them or do not
like them; and training is the only way to beat that disease. Second, psychologically they
are different because they are completely unequivalent when you are trying to guess new
laws. As long as physics is incomplete, and we are trying to understand the other laws,
then the different possible formulations may give clues about what might happen in other
circumstances. In that case they are no longer equivalent, psychologically, in suggesting
to us guesses about what the laws may look like in a wider situation.
Richard Feynman offers the view of a great scientist pushing the state of the art in
physics, a task he was able to successfully accomplish several times; for a prime example
of his accomplishments related to formulation of Quantum Mechanics by teleological
principles, see Feynman and Hibbs (1965). I will add some remarks on the importance of
considering alternative metaphysical models and mathematical formulations of physical
laws from the humble perspective of a physics teacher:
Occasionally, I had the responsibility of teaching an introductory discipline in Ana-
lytical Mechanics to junior students of physics or applied mathematics, using standard
textbooks like Marion (1970) or Goldstein (1980). One of the first tasks in such a disci-
pline is to prove that (except for some exceptional cases at the corners of the formalism)
the laws of mechanics, as described by Newton, Lagrange or Hamilton, are exactly the
same. However, after achieving this goal, I emphatically warn the students that such
theorems can be quite misleading. More specifically, I try to show them that, if they
want to harness all the power provided by the tools of Analytical Mechanics, they should
be willing to embrace full-heartedly its teleological spirit, and get ready to ask and imag-
ine – what is it that the particle or the spin-top “should do” or “wants to do” – in order
to minimize the appropriate functional of its (future) trajectory. This is not an easy
skill to master, being perhaps even more challenging then the skills needed for correct
algebraic manipulation of the pertinent equations. Nevertheless, from my experience,
developing this sort of geometric view and analogical thinking is the very key to success
in this discipline, for it provides the guidelines to approach each new problem, to cor-
rectly structure its mathematical framework, and to assemble the equations required to
solve it.
6 Know-How and Well-Adapted Ontologies
As a teenager, in the early 70’s, I had the opportunity to take classes at the Sa˜o Paulo
municipal planetarium, and also to participate at the local Amateur Telescope Making
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Figure 13: Grinding, testing & adjusting a telescope mirror precise shape
club. Figures 13 (left) illustrate the activity of grinding your own telescope mirror, a
task accomplished by rubbing two initially plane glass discs against each other with the
help of a sequence of coarser (for grinding) to finer (for polishing) abrasive powders. In
this process, the disc at the top, the tool, takes a convex shape, while the disc at the
bottom, the mirror, takes a concave shape. The goal of this long and tedious work is
to obtain a perfectly spherical (or parabolic) and well polished mirror piece, that can
then receive a light reflective silver coating, in order to be used as a mirror for an actual
amateur telescope, see Ingalls (1953), Thompson (1947) and Texereau (1957).
All points on the surface of a perfectly spherical lens or mirror should be at the same
distance of its center of curvature. However, actual grinding is not a flawless process,
and real lenses or mirrors deviate from their ideal forms. Consequently, the surface of
an actual mirror or lens wabbles around its ideal form, like the waves exhibited by a
thin disc plate vibrating around its natural resting plane, or the ripples we see at the
surface of the cup of coffee in Figure 14 (center). Figures 14 (left and right) show typical
angular and radial profiles of these characteristic modes of vibration.
The aforementioned characteristic forms of vibration can be mathematically de-
scribed by special eigen-functions. Figure 15, a composite from Genberg and Michels
(2004) and Zou and Wattellier (2012), gives, at the top row, an illustration of a few of
these eigen-functions, that also describe typical forms of aberration (i.e., deformation
relative to its ideal form) that may occur in the surface of a mirror. The next subsection
comments on some relevant mathematical properties of these eigen-functions.
Thank God, as a teenager, I did not need to know all that heavy mathematics in
order to make my amateur telescope. Figures 13 (right) and Figure 15 (middle row)
illustrate a practical technique (developed by the already mentioned Le´on Foucault)
used to carefully illuminate the surface of the mirror piece during the grinding process
in order to obtain light and shadow effects that allow the detection of the aforementioned
Figure 14: Waves and wobbles on the surface of a disc
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Figure 15: Z(n,m) – Zernike eigen-functions and objects in ophthalmology and
optics: Z(2, 0), Defocus; Z(2, 2), Astigmatism; Z(3, 1), Coma; Z(4, 0), Spherical.
aberrations, see Harbour (2001) and Texereau (1957). Once a characteristic aberration
is detected, a corresponding corrective grinding maneuver (a.k.a. retouching procedure)
can be applied, allowing the mirror fabrication process to converge to the desired ideal
form, see next sub-section for additional details.
Historically, see Abrahams (1994) and King (1955), practical know-how used for
telescope making was developed by optical artisans long before the development of the
corresponding mathematical eigen-function theory, even though, as it can clearly be seen
in Figure 15, there is a close connection between the two.
Figure 15 (bottom row) depicts the image of a single and distant bright point pro-
duced by an optical element (mirror or lens) suffering from the corresponding aberration.
The reader will probably recognize the standard names given to these eigen-forms as
“diagnostics” made by an ophthalmologist or optometrist, for these names correspond
to typical aberrations affecting the biological lens of an human eye. Long before the
invention of the telescope, since the late XIII century, artisans manufacturing magni-
fying glasses and spectacles had a practical know-how about these eigen-forms, being
able to manufacture eyeglasses with the same or complementary characteristics that, in
turn, were used to alleviate corresponding symptoms of their patients. In fact, it can
be argued that it was the ready availability of a variety of such lenses that made the
invention of the telescope possible in the XVII century, see Helden (1977), Helden et
al. (2010), Ilardi (2007) and also Morrison (1987), including the episode Lenses and
Telescopes from the accompanying PBS videos.
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Now the stage is set for discussing ontology, from the perspective of the Objective
Cognitive Constructivism epistemological framework.
• In computer and information science, an ontology provides a basis for knowledge
representation and information processing in an established field of activity, like a scien-
tific discipline. It can be conceived as a formal lexicon, that is, a controlled vocabulary
with nouns used to name key entities and concepts of the pertinent domain of discourse,
and also adjectives, verbs and adverbs used to name their properties and interrelations.
• In classical philosophy, the word ontology is etymologically derived from oν or oν
(being, that which is, actual, real), the present participle of the verb ιµι (to be). Hence,
ontology concerns the study of being, that is, it addresses the question of what entities
exist or may be said to exist, their properties and interrelations.
In the Objective Cognitive Constructivism epistemological framework, both notions
of ontology are brought together by the key notion of objectivity, as discussed in previous
sections. Recalling once again von Foerster’s metaphor: Objects are tokens for eigen-
behaviors. Furthermore, eigen-solutions have four essential properties, namely, precision
(or sharpness), stability, separation and composition. Finally, the quality (or ontological
status) of objects can be evaluated and measured by the degree in which the correspond-
ing eigen-solutions manifest their four essential properties, as further discussed in the
next subsection.
Orthogonality, Completeness, Invariance and Well-Adaptedness
This subsection discusses the four essential properties of eigen-solutions as they are
expressed, in a very strong and rigorous way, by the eigen-functions discussed in this
section. Some details in this subsection presuppose familiarity with pertinent mathemat-
ical methods; however, these details can be skipped without impairing the understanding
of general ideas.
The characteristic (angular and radial) eigen-forms of a vibrating disc plate are math-
ematically described by eigen-functions traditionally named after, respectively, Joseph
Fourier (1768-1830) and Friedrich Bessel (1784-1846), see Butkov (1968), Courant and
Hilbert (1953), and Figure 14. The corresponding joint two-dimensional description
of the plate’s vibration is known as a Fourier-Bessel decomposition, see Butkov (1968,
Sec.9.7, p.363-368), Courant and Hilbert (1953, v.1, Sec.5.6, p.307-308), Reddy (2007,
Sec.5.5.1-2, p.200-202), and Figure 15. In the field of optics, Zernike polynomials,
Z(n,m), are commonly used as a computationally more convenient representation but
mathematically equivalent alternative to the Fourier-Bessel decomposition, see Khotan-
zad and Hong (1990), Lakshminarayanana and Flecka (2011) and Wang et al. (2008).
Orthogonality is a strong form of separability, and a most convenient property ex-
hibited by the eigen-fuctions used in the case at hand. Orthogonality means that we
can apply a retouching maneuver designed to correct a single characteristic aberration,
without aggravating another, that is, it is possible to deal separately or independently
with simple problems corresponding to each element of the eigen-function basis. From
a physical point of view, each element of the Fourier-Bessel decomposition describes a
standing, self-sustaining or resonating mode of vibration. Accordingly, each of these
eigen-forms of vibration can store a well-defined amount of energy, see French (1971,
Ch.6, p.181-188) and Stern (2017a, Sec.5).
The concept of orthogonality can be relaxed and usefully extended into many ap-
plication areas, for example: In the design of formal languages, it may designate non-
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redundancy conditions; in categorization or classification systems, it may indicate mu-
tually exclusive or non-ambiguity conditions; in combinatorics, it may reveal a matroid
structure; in dynamic systems, it may imply local transversality conditions; in statistical
modeling, it may refer to non-correlation or alternative forms of non-association; etc.
As in other examples previously examined in this article, either the Fourier-Bessel or
the Zernike basis of eigen-functions is complete, that is, any (continuous) deformation
of a disc plate can be composed as a linear combination of its elements. In this way,
one can decompose a complex aberration into its basic elements, allowing for separate
corrective actions that, together, take care of the original complex problem.
Well-Adaptedness (to the specific context of application) is yet another important
property of the eigen-functions under consideration. The availability of an orthogonal
system of eigen-forms of aberration and corresponding corrective maneuvers would be
of little help if we had to apply an infinite number of them. In principle, this unfortu-
nate situation could be possible, for there are an infinite number of those eigen-forms,
corresponding to the eigen-functions Z(n,m) for n,m = 0, 1, 2, 3 . . . .
Fortunately, in the art of mirror grinding, only a few of those infinite eigen-forms of
aberration are of practical importance, namely, only eigen-forms or lower order (that
is, terms corresponding to small values of n and m) appear in practice. This kind of
fast convergence is a natural consequence of the specific eigen-functions being used and
of energy conservation and finiteness, namely: The energy stored in angular (or radial)
normal vibration modes of order, n, that is, corresponding to Fourier (or Bessel) terms
or order, n, is proportional to the square of the vibration order, n2, and the square of
the vibration amplitude, A2n, see Jarvis (2016) and Sadun(2007). Hence, the amplitude
of higher modes of vibration must converge rapidly (super-linearly) to zero, technically:
E =
∑∞
n=0
En <∞⇒
∑∞
n=0
n2A2n <∞⇒ An = O( 1/n3/2+δ ) .
Fourier, Bessel and similar special functions provide systems of eigen-solutions that
are well-adapted to many application areas of classical and modern physics, see Butkov
(1968) and Courant and Hilbert (1953). Hence, following a path similar to the one taken
in this article, it is possible to establish connections between elements of such a system
of eigen-functions and key elements of the scientific ontology used in the corresponding
application area. For example, Stern (2008, 2014, 2017a) analyze, from the perspective
of Objective Cognitive Constructivism, the correspondence between key elements of
musical ontology (like musical notes, chords and forms of harmony) and the eigen-
solutions of a vibrating string, see also Benade (1960). Recent and ongoing research in
wavelet theory aims to provide well-adapted eigen-solutions to a wider class of problems
based on concepts like self-similarity and other recursive relations, see Aboufadel and
Schlicker (1999) for a gentle introduction and also Resnikoff and Wells (1998).
7 Heavy Anchors: Bayesian Epistemic Values
The main objective of this article is to use intuitive ideas to provide an easy introduction
to the objective cognitive constructivism epistemological framework. Accordingly, sev-
eral aspects have been presented in (over) simplified form, for one can not hope to write
a gentle introductory text striving, at the same time, for utmost rigor and completeness.
In contrast, the main objective of this section is to consider some heavy methodological
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Figure 16: Statistical modeling diagram.
anchors developed in previous publications, for they are the tools used to build strong
and well-defined connections between intuitive but somewhat intangible epistemological
ideas and the practical procedures of empirical science. Additionally, this section sur-
veys some previous related publications examining more technical or narrowly focused
aspects of epistemology.
Notwithstanding its introductory and intuitive character, this paper is conceived as
an integral part of a comprehensive research program in the area of Bayesian statistics
and epistemology. This section presents a general overview of this research program,
mapping several already published articles in which specific topics of interest related to
the present paper are discussed in greater detail and depth.
The Full Bayesian Significance Test (FBST) is a statistical test of hypothesis pub-
lished by Pereira and Stern (1999) and further extended in Madruga et al. (2003)
and Pereira et al. (2008). This solution is anchored by a novel measure of statistical
significance known as the e-value, ev (H |X), a.k.a. the evidence value provided by ob-
servational data X in support of the statistical hypothesis H or, the other way around,
the epistemic value of hypothesis H given the observational data X. The e-value, its
theoretical properties and its applications have been a topic of research for many collab-
orators around the world for the last 20 years; Pereira and Stern (2020) give a panoramic
view of this program, listing hundreds of publications.
Eigen-solutions, as depicted at the center of the Scientific production diagram in
Figure 10, are represented, in the context of mathematical statistics, by sharp statistical
hypotheses, as depicted at the center of the Statistical modeling diagram in Figure 16;
see Stern (2017) for further details. The e-value and the FBST were specially designed
to evaluate the degree of precision of sharp statistical hypotheses, and also to verify
the accuracy of exact compositional rules for hypotheses of this kind. Therefore, the
e-value and the FBST can be used as a statistical touchstone that is taylor-made to
the task of accessing the objectivity of scientific eigen-solutions, as this notion is defined
in the context of objective cognitive constructivism. Further mathematical, statistical,
and logical or compositional properties of the e-value are discussed in Borges and Stern
(2007), Esteves et al. (2016, 2019), Izbicki and Esteves (2015), and Stern et al. (2017).
The Classical or Frequentist school of mathematical statistics offers the p-value as its
signature significance measure for statistical hypotheses. In contrast, traditionally, the
Bayesian school offers the Bayes Factor as its own alternative to a significance measure.
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These two were the leading schools of statistical science during the XX century, and
each one of them has developed its own inference procedures for testing hypotheses.
Nevertheless, the mathematical, statistical, and logical properties of e-values, p-
values and Bayes Factors are very different, and so are the properties of their corre-
sponding hypothesis tests and related inference methods. Therefore, the epistemologi-
cal frameworks used by these three programs are also quite different, for they have to
accommodate discrepant properties of the aforementioned significance measures. Nowa-
days, p-values are usually presented embedded in an epistemological framework based
on Popperian falsificationism, while Bayes Factors are usually presented in the context
of stochastic decision theory (optimal gambling strategy). Stern and Pereira (2014)
analyze the contrasting mathematical properties of each of the three aforementioned
significance measures and the consequential differences between corresponding statis-
tical inference procedures. Stern (2011a,b) analyze the contrasting characteristics of
the corresponding epistemological frameworks, developed to harbor and support their
specific inference methods.
The objective cognitive constructivism epistemological framework has its origins in
cognitive constructivism as developed by Maturana and Varela (1980), Foerster (2003),
Foerster and Segal (2001), Krohn and Ku¨ppers (1990), Zeleny (1980), and many others.
Nevertheless, the objective character of the former sets it apart from its predecessors.
Stern (2007a,b, 2008, 2014) give detailed analyses of the similarities and differences
between these frameworks. Stern (2015) considers some frequent questions concern-
ing the similarities and differences between objective cognitive constructivism and the
epistemological framework developed by the philosopher Willard van Orman Quine.
Statistical textbooks tend to de-emphasize epistemological foundations and play
down the philosophical commitments made by each statistical school, presenting theory
and methods in the most pragmatical way possible. Nevertheless, the development of
each of the aforementioned statistical schools and and their programs was strongly in-
fluenced or even guided the these philosophical commitments. Stern (2018) analyzes the
work of Karl Pearson (1857-1936), founder of the frequentist school, and the importance
of his philosophical commitment to anti-Spinozism, a form of transcendental idealism,
to the development of the theory, methods and language of classical statistics. The
same article analyzes the objections of K.Pearson to the epistemological views of Paul
Volkmann (1856-1938), who presents his ideas based on the metaphor of the scientific
system as a vaulted arch. Furthermore, Stern (2018) argues that Volkmann’s vaulted
arch metaphor could be seen as a distant forerunner of cognitive constructivism. A some-
what related metaphor, the Arch of Knowledge, is developed by David Oldroyd (1986),
who uses this metaphor as his guideline to conduct a systematic study of history, philos-
ophy and methodology of science. The e-value and objective cognitive constructivism
research program has a log way to go until a similar wide-range systematic comparison
with alternative epistemological frameworks is available. Nevertheless, the first steps
in this long journey have already been taken, focusing on the immediate vicinity of
epistemological frameworks most relevant to modern statistical inference.
8 Final Remarks
Trying to understand our quest for knowledge, specially in the realm of exact sciences,
this article explored two main metaphors, namely, Science as provider of sharper images
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of our world, and von Foerster’s metaphor of Objects as tokens for eigen-behaviors. We
tried to show how these metaphors can be helpful in building an integrated and coherent
perspective of the development of a scientific discipline, and in the understanding of its
ordinary activities. However, as it is often the case when a new metaphor is presented,
some inherent limitations of metaphorical argumentation in general, and those we used
in particular, are brought to light and should be examined. We shall also consider the
possibility of extending the application of the epistemological framework developed in
his article to other areas, like human sciences. Those issues are discussed in the next
subsections.
Metaphoric and Polysemic Objective Ontologies
As shown in Sections 6, some key objects of the standard ontology of optical science
directly correspond to elements in the system of eigen-functions used to describe the
eigen-solutions of a vibrating disc plate, for example, the ideal forms of lenses and
mirrors, and their classical aberrations. As shown in Stern (2008, 2014, 2017a), some
key objects of the standard ontology of musical science directly correspond to elements
in the system of eigen-functions used to describe the eigen-solutions of a vibrating string,
for example, musical notes in classical scales. In either case, von Foerster’s metaphor –
objects are tokens for eigen-behaviors – can be applied quite literary.
Other words of these ontologies stand for compositional rules and for ways to use
the preceding objects to accomplish specific goals. For example, Keplerian (paraxial)
optics give us precise prescriptions to align and collimate the distance between lenses
and mirrors in a telescope in order to obtain well-focused images, see Appendix A and
previous sections. In the same way, musical science has precise prescriptions on how
to synchronically compose separate notes into consonant or dissonant chords, and how
to diachronically arrange them into melodic lines. These compositional rules and their
applications also express the four essential properties of eigen-solutions, namely, stability,
precision, separation and composition. Nevertheless, the correspondence between these
words and underlying systems of eigen-solutions is more remote or indirect. Hence, von
Foerster’s metaphor can only be applied in a more abstract or figurative sense. Even
farther removed is the connection of the underlying eigen-solutions with the variety
of means and methods (and the words and language used to describe them) used by
artisans and technicians in the craft of building optical or musical instruments so that
they perform as expected, that is, so that they can be used to play the fine tuned music
we want to hear or to render the sharp images we want to see.
Furthermore, in historical development optical instruments and their manufacturing
techniques, generations of artisans have acquired practical knowledge about objects in
those ontologies long before the mathematics used to formally describe a system of
underlying eigen-functions was available, see King (1955) and the bibliography therein.
In fact, the other way around, it is possible to see such mathematical formalisms as
languages developed to describe, in the best way we currently can, some peculiar patterns
that emerge in our ways of recurrent interaction, patterns deemed peculiar for exhibiting
the aforementioned essential properties of eigen-solutions. In this regard, see Stern
(2011a) for a discussion of A´rpa´d Szabo´ and Imre Lakatos’ views of mathematics as a
quasi-empirical science.
The observations in the last paragraph make us contemplate, once again, the circular,
recursive and, at least to some degree, polysemic and figurative nature of the metaphors
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and associated concepts used in the Objective Cognitive Constructivism epistemological
framework. This situation may be accompanied by sensations ranging from slightly
discomfort to lightheadedness or strong vertigo. Hence the question: Is this situation
unavoidable?
Would it not be possible to find a steady vantage point or an absolute reference frame
from which to observe the evolution of a scientific discipline, or even to get a snapshot
of its current state of affairs, in a way that dispenses intrinsically circular definitions,
avoids reference to recursive processes, and evades the use of polysemic concepts or
metaphorical language? According to the constructivist framework, the answer is in the
negative. Any attempt to secure such a privileged position would not only be futile,
but essentially misconceived. Nevertheless, if the former task is hopeless, the general
situation is promising for, as stated in one of the opening quotations of this article:
You can dance in a hurricane, but only if you are standing in the eye!
From the perspective of Objective Cognitive Constructivism, the best available van-
tage point is the eye of the hurricane, in analogy to the central point of the production
diagrams depicted at Figures 9 and 10. Paradoxically, the very center of the spinning
whirlwind is the quiet place where recursive eigen-solutions of those production processes
can emerge and be sustained.
Furthermore, as discussed at Sections 4 and 7, each one of the aforementioned produc-
tion contexts is equipped with well-defined quantitative measures specifically designed
to evaluate how well emerging eigen-solutions manifest their required essential proper-
ties. In this way, such measures act as technical touch-stones tailor-made to the task
of accessing the objectivity of those entities and corresponding terms in the ontology in
which they are represented. Such a steadfast ontology gives us a firm grip on the world,
allows us to “carve nature at its joints” or, at least, according to the Objective Con-
gnitive Constructivism epistemological framework, provides the best anchors to reality
that we can possibly have. See Palma (2016) and Stern (2007b, 2011a and 2014) for
further discussion of some topics briefly presented in this subsection.
Eigen-Solutions and Human Sciences
von Foerter’s metaphor – Objects are tokens for eigen-behaviors – stresses the role of
an interacting agent. In this context, recognizable objects (and their names) stand for
invariant patterns that emerge in the agent’s recurrent forms of interaction with his
environment. In the case of economy, sociology, political and legal studies, psychology,
and other human sciences, the agents responsible for those interactions are (in different
degrees) conscious or self-aware of their role in the process, and organized in complex
patterns of interaction, introducing additional and interesting aspects to be considered.
Let us examine, as a familiar example, prices of commodity goods and related assets
in an economic system. Such prices are nominated in a currency that, in turn, can be
denominated by money, like the coins in Figure 17. All these coins have circulated over
a common geographic area in a time period spanning less then a century. Among these,
the Euro (left, issued in 2014, featuring Galileo) is considered a strong currency; the
East-German Mark (center, 1971, featuring Kepler), a weaker one; and the notgeld or
emergency money issued by the city of Halle at the interbellum hyper-inflation period
(right, 1920, displaying moon and stars), the weakest. Why this hierarchy? Because of
how well the eigen-values they denominate (prices in the respective economies) manifest
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Figure 17: Stronger/ weaker tokens for sharper/ blurrier eigen-values
the essential properties of an eigen-solution, see Debreu (1972) and Ingrao and Israel
(1990) for further details. Cerezetti and Stern (2012) consider how specific measures of
the precision, stability, and effectiveness of composition rules for prices of fundamental
commodities and derivative contracts in financial markets can be used to guide either
speculative trading or regulatory intervention in the same markets.
Stern (2018a) makes some incursions exploring applications to human sciences of the
epistemological framework developed in this article in the area of empirical legal studies;
in the near future we intend to pursue similar lines of research. We are particularly
interested in the analysis and acceptability of causal explanations based on Niels Bohr
complementarity principle in the context of economics, legal studies and psychology.
Historiographical and Pedagogical Disclaimers
In this article I made use of some narratives concerning the historical development
of science and technology, and I have also described some pedagogical materials used
for teaching science to children and adolescents. Nevertheless, I am not an historian,
and my teaching experience is limited to the university. Therefore, the use I made of
the aforementioned examples should be taken with a grain of salt: Regarding histori-
cal narratives, they often reflect common knowledge, and are not intended as position
statements in the fields of historiography or history of science; see Kuukkanen (2012),
Martins (2001), Sauer and Scholl (2012). Regarding pedagogical materials, they belong
to the long-gone time of my youth, the way I describe them reflects mostly my own
experiences, and these are not intended as position statements in the field. Develop-
ment of pedagogical materials appropriate for classroom requires an holistic approach
and coordinated team effort, see for example Benfey et al. (1964), Fuller et al. (1978),
Haber-Schaim et al. (1976), Malm et al. (1963), Pimentel et al. (1963) and Welch et
al. (1968). Moreover, effective pedagogical projects should take into account and be
adapted to the cultural background and social environment of intended students.
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Appendix A: Kepler’s Paraxial Optics,
Presented in Modern Matrix Notation
When analyzing the behavior of a given system, it is often a good idea to try an input-
output approach combined with linear approximations. An input-output approach seeks
a descriptive functional relation between relevant input and output variables for the
system in study. In a linear approximation, each output variable is described as a
linear combination of the input variables or, equivalently, the input and output vector
variables, v and w, are related by a linear (matrix) operator, w = Av. In this appendix
we follow Kleinfeld and Tsai (2004), see also Pedrotti et al. (2017, Ch.18), and Gerrard
and Burch (1975, Ch.1 and 2).
In the Transfer (or propagation) Matrix approach to optics, the optical system is
described by the trajectory of light rays in the system, see Figure 18. The coordinate x
locates the ray as it passes through the system, and vector variables
[
y α
]t
describe
the ray’s height and the angle (in radians) relative to axis x.
The action of an optical elements is modeled by a linear operator, represented by a
matrix A, that is,[
y′
α′
]
= A
[
y
α
]
=
[
A1,1 A1,2
A2,1 A2,2
] [
y
α
]
=
[
A1,1y + A1,2α
A2,1y + A2,1α
]
.
Taking the standard basis
[
1 0
]t
and
[
0 1
]t
as input vectors, we notice that
the first column of A describes the action of the optical element over a light ray parallel
to x at unitary height, while the second column of A describes the action of the optical
element at zero height and unitary inclination.
Moreover, in the transfer matrix approach to optics, C, the transfer matrix of a
system composed by two optical elements, A and B (aligned left to right), is obtained
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Figure 18: Keplerian or paraxial optics
by multiplying (right to left) the matrices corresponding to its constituent elements.
C = BA =
[
B1,1A1,1 +B1,2A2,1 B1,1A1,2 +B1,2A2,2
B2,1A1,1 +B2,2A2,1 B2,1A1,2 +B2,2A2,2
]
Linear ray optics offers good approximations to real optical systems as long as the
following hypotheses hold: (1) Small angles, that is, θ << 1, so that sin θ ≈ tan θ ≈ θ;
(2) Small heights (paraxial rays), that is, y << r, where r is the radius of spherical
elements to be specified in the sequel; (3) Thin elements, that is, the change in height
of a light ray while traveling inside an optical element is negligible. Assuming the
aforementioned conditions to hold, we derive the transfer matrices for a few optical
elements and simple optical systems.
D(d) – Distance d simple translation: A light ray traveling through an homogeneous
medium follows a straight line. Traveling a distance d at angle α changes the ray’s
height by d tanα ≈ dα.
F (n, n′) – Flat (orthogonal to x) interface from medium n to n′. Crossing a flat
interface causes no change in the height of a ray, while its angle changes according to
the linear version of Snell-Descartes law, that is, sin θ′ = (n/n′) sin θ ⇒ θ′ ≈ (n/n′)θ.
D(d) =
[
1 d
0 1
]
; F (n, n′) =
[
1 0
0 n/n′
]
.
S(n, n′, r) – Spherical interface or radius r (where r is positive/ negative for a convex/
concave interface). First, notice that a ray of zero height an angle α behaves as passing
through a flat interface, giving us the second column of matrix S. Meanwhile, at the
point a ray with unit height and parallel (α = 0) to the axis meets the interface, the
angle between incoming ray and the spherical radius is θ = arcsin 1/r ≈ 1/r. Using the
linear version of Snell’s law, we get θ′ = (n/n′)θ. Finally, using the identity α′ = θ′ − θ,
we get
S(n, n′, r) =
[
1 0
(n− n′)/r n′ n/n′
]
.
M(r) – Mirror of radius r (where r is positive/ negative for a concave/ convex
spherical mirror). Arguments similar to the ones used in previous case, give us the
transfer matrix for the spherical mirror.
M(r) =
[
1 0
2/r 1
]
.
We can now obtain the transfer matrices of some simple optical systems by multi-
plying (right to left) the transfer matrices of their constituent elements (left to right).
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L(n, n′, r1, r2) – Lens made by a thin sequence of convex and concave interfaces
(r1 > 0 and r2 < 0), with exterior medium n and internal medium n
′. It is easier
to write this matrix as L(f), using as an auxiliary variable the lens’ focal distance, f ,
defined as (1/f) = (1/r1 − 1/r2)(n′ − n)/n,
L(n, n′, r1, r2) = S(n′, n, r2)S(n, n′, r1) =
[
1 0
−1/f 1
]
= L(f) .
T (f1, f2, d) – Telescope using two thin lenses with focal distances f1 and f2 separated
by a distance d.
T (f1, f2, d) = L(f2)L(f1) =
[
1− d/f1 d
(d− f1 − f2)/(f1 f2) 1− d/f2
]
.
C(f1, f2) – Collimated telescope, namely, T (f1, f2, d) adjusting d = f1 + f2. The
matrix element A1,1 = −f2/f1 gives the collimated telescope’s magnification coefficient
for the image of a distant object; the negative sign indicating an inverted image.
C(f1, f2) =
[ −f2/f1 f1 + f2
0 −f1/f2
]
.
Appendix B: Principle of Least Time
Consider a beach with shore line represented by x = a, in the standard Cartesian
plane. A lifeguard, at position (x, y) = (0, 0), spots a person drowning at position
(x, y) = (a+ b, d). While on the athletic track the lifeguard car can run at top speed c,
on the sand it can run at speed c/ν1. Once in the water, the lifeguard can only swim
at speed c/ν2, 1 < ν1 < ν2. Letting (x, y) = (a, y(a)) be the point where he enters the
water, what is the optimal value y(a) = z if he wants to reach position (a+ b, d) as fast
as possible?
Since the shortest path in an homogenous medium is a straight line, the optimal
trajectory is a broken line, from (0, 0) to (a, z), and then from (a, z) to (a + b, d). The
total travel time is J(z)/c, where
J(z) = ν1
√
a2 + z2 + ν2
√
b2 + (d− z)2 .
Since we want J(z) at a minimum, we set
dJ
dz
= ν1
−2z
2
√
a2 + z2
+ ν2
−2(d− z)
2
√
b2 + (d− z)2 = 0 ,
so that, we should have
ν1 sin(θ1) = ν2 sin(θ2) .
Professional lifeguards claim that this simple model can be improved by dividing
the sand in a dry band, V1, and a wet band, V2, and the water in a shallow band, V3,
and a deep band, V4, with respective different media ‘resistance’ indices, ν1, ν2, ν3, ν4,
satisfying ν4 > ν3 > ν1 > ν2 > 1. Although the solution for the improved model can
be similarly obtained, a general formalism to solve ‘variational’ problems of this kind
exists which is known as the Euler-Lagrange equation. For intuitive introductions see
Krasnov et al. (1973), Leech (1963) and Marion (1970).
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